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Taiwo v Olaigbe and another: Onu v Akwiwu and another [2016] UKSC 
31 
 
 The cases involved the mistreatment of migrant domestic workers by 
their employers and whether such action amounted to direct or indirect 
race discrimination.  
 The Equality Act 2010 holds direct and indirect discrimination as forms 
of prohibited conduct when applied to a person’s protected 
characteristic – section 13(1) identifies ‘race’ as a protected 
characteristic and this includes a person’s colour, nationality, ethnic 
and national origin.  
 The question for the Supreme Court was whether the appellants 
suffered mistreatment on the basis of their nationality (which would be 
protected by s 13(1)) or due to their vulnerable immigration status 
(which is not protected).  
 Ultimately, the Supreme Court held that neither appellant suffered 
discrimination due to their nationality (and hence race). 
 
The Facts 
 
Ms Taiwo’s case  
 
Ms Taiwo, a Nigerian national, entered the UK in 2010 with a migrant worker’s 
visa obtained, falsely, by her employers Mr and Mrs Olaigbe. They achieved 
this on the basis of a ‘manufactured history’ of previous employment between 
Ms Taiwo and the parents of Mr Olaigbe. Mr and Mrs Olaigbe had two 
children, and at the time were fostering a further two children. Ms Taiwo was 
engaged as a carer for the children. Olaigbe had fabricated a contract of 
employment for Ms Taiwo and, on her arrival in the UK, confiscated her 
passport. 
 
Ms Taiwo’s responsibilities included being ‘on duty’ most of her waking time 
with no rest periods (contrary to the Working Time Regulations 1998 (SI 
1998/1883)); she had not been paid the minimum wage; she was not provided 
with sufficient food – leading to dramatic weight loss; and she was subject to 
physical and mental abuse by Mr and Mrs Olaigbe and his mother. Ms Taiwo 
shared a bedroom with the children and was subject to conduct which the 
Employment Appeal Tribunal considered as ‘systematic and callous 
exploitation.’ 
 
In April 2011 Ms Taiwo succeeded in her claims against the employer under 
the National Minimum Wage Act 1998; s 13 of the Employment Rights Act 
1996; the Working Time Regulations 1998 and for failure to provide a written 
statement of particulars as required under s 1 of the 1996 Act. Ms Taiwo also 
brought proceedings on the basis of direct and indirect race discrimination 
under the Equality Act (EA) 2010 and the Race Relations Act (RRA) 1976.  
 
Ms Onu’s case 
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Ms Onu’s case was similar to that of Ms Taiwo. She too was a Nigerian 
national who entered the UK on a domestic worker’s visa obtained by her 
employers. Again, false information had been provided to the UK authorities in 
order to obtain the visa. Her contract of employment (to which Ms Onu never 
had access) was drafted in Nigeria and included clauses that she had to 
remain in their employ for a minimum of one year and if she broke this 
agreement, Ms Onu would be reported to the police and the immigration 
authorities. Ms Onu worked on average 84 hours per week caring for the 
employers’ children (one of whom required special care) and was not 
provided with statutorily required rest periods, annual leave, nor was she paid 
the minimum wage. Ms Onu was threatened and abused by her employer. 
Following her escape from the employer, Ms Onu brought proceedings on the 
same grounds as Ms Taiwo, adding harassment and victimisation under the 
EA 2010. 
 
The employment tribunal upheld her claims. They found Ms Onu to have been 
constructively and unfairly dismissed and, significantly, to have been directly 
discriminated against and harassed on the grounds of race. The employers 
had treated her less favourably than they would have treated someone who 
was not a migrant worker. However, the EAT reversed the finding of 
discrimination on the basis of race, maintaining the employers’ treatment of 
Ms Onu was inherently based on her subordinate position. It further rejected a 
claim of indirect discrimination based on a provision, criterion or practice 
(PCP) of ‘the mistreatment of migrant domestic workers.’  
 
The Issues 
 
The Court of Appeal heard both appeals and determined, on the question of 
direct discrimination, two issues. The first, the grounds issue, was rejected as 
the employers had not published nor applied a discriminatory criterion. The 
second, the nationality issue, was also rejected as immigration status was not 
to be equated with ‘nationality’ for the purpose of the RRA 1976 and EA 2010.  
 
A further argument was presented on the basis of indirect discrimination. 
There was also no indirect discrimination present as the mistreatment of 
migrant workers was not a PCP. The employers’ actions were not what 
indirect discrimination was intended to address. This was not a neutral 
criterion that disproportionately disadvantaged some of those to whom it 
applied when compared with others. 
 
Ms Taiwo was granted leave to appeal on the nationality issue and was joined 
in her appeal by Ms Onu. 
 
The Judgment 
 
The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals of both Ms Taiwo and Ms Onu as 
neither had been the victim of race discrimination. The abuse they suffered, 
although clearly wrong, was as a result of their vulnerability as a migrant 
worker rather than their nationality. 
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Reasoning 
 
The EA 2010 provides, in s 13(1), that a person (A) discriminates against 
another (B) if, because of a protected characteristic, A treats B less favourably 
than A treats or would treat others. ‘Race’ is one of nine protected 
characteristics covered by the Act and at s 9(1) race ‘includes (a) colour, (b) 
nationality, and (c) ethnic or national origins.’ It was acknowledged by Lady 
Hale, providing the only substantive judgment, that the appellants had been 
treated disgracefully, and that this was on the basis of their vulnerable 
immigration status. Unlawful direct discrimination would have occurred had 
the conduct of the employers been ‘on racial grounds’ (per the RRA 1976) or 
‘because of’ race (per the EA 2010) However, neither the RRA 1976 or the EA 
2010 include nationality in the definition of race. 
 
Arguments were presented that immigration status is a function of nationality 
(para. 15) and is indissociable from it. On this basis, broad interpretations of 
nationality exist in article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights 
(‘any ground such as ... national or social origin ... or other status’) and s 28(4) 
of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 (a racial group means ‘a group of persons 
defined by reference to race, colour, nationality (including citizenship) or 
ethnic or national origins’).  
 
However, these sources did not need to distinguish between immigration 
status and nationality discrimination and were not instructive in interpreting 
the RRA 1976 or the EA 2010. Parliament, when enacting the EA 2010 and its 
predecessors, had the ability to include immigration status as a protected 
characteristic but chose not to (para. 22). Also, whilst accepted that 
immigration status is a function of nationality in that non-British nationals 
(apart from Irish citizens) are subject to immigration control, there exist a wide 
variety of immigration statuses. Ms Taiwo and Ms Onu were both particularly 
vulnerable to the mistreatment they suffered as they entered the UK on 
domestic workers’ visas which were granted for one year, although 
renewable, and employees would need approval of the immigration authorities 
to change their employer while in the UK. Other vulnerabilities present 
included that the employees were engaged (and resided) in the UK without 
their family or other support networks; they were unfamiliar with UK culture 
and language; they worked long hours; they had little knowledge of their legal 
rights; they worked in private homes which are less easy to regulate; they 
were often paid informally; and they had no recourse to public funds (para. 
25). Despite these factors, there are many non-British nationals living and 
working in the UK who do not share this vulnerability. It was further 
acknowledged that UK nationals working in the employers’ homes would not 
have been so badly treated, nor would they have treated non-British nationals 
who had the right to live and work in the UK in this way (para. 26). 
 
The case did not involve indirect discrimination (para. 31), either under the EA 
2010 or the RRA 1976. There was no PCP as required under s 19 EA 2010, 
but the Supreme Court maintained that this did not prevent the possibility of 
indirect discrimination occurring in other cases involving the exploitation of 
migrant workers (para. 33). 
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Commentary 
 
Nationality 
 
The term ‘nationality’ is based on a person being a national of a particular 
country or can also involve their non-nationality (non-UK national etc) and 
constitutes a significant aspect of their identity. Further, his or her identity will 
likely include more than one aspect of ‘race’ such as their colour, their 
national and/or ethnic origins, and may, for the purposes of the appellants to 
the current cases, include their immigration status. Therefore migrants, 
refugees, asylum seekers (for example) possess multiple identities and are 
largely protected against being discriminated against, being harassed or 
victimised, by equality laws – on the basis of their age, sex, sexual orientation, 
disability, religion or belief and so on. It is also true that for many migrants, 
their nationality (their particular nationality and the fact that they may be 
considered as a ‘foreigner’ – a non-national) constitutes a significant aspect of 
their negative experience. They may be particularly vulnerable to 
discrimination, harassment and prejudice experiences whilst in the UK.  
 
Particular Vulnerabilities of Migrant Workers 
 
Migrant workers are likely to suffer disadvantages which are unique to their 
status and to those (non-migrants) who share a common protected 
characteristic other than their race. They are less likely in many instances to 
have the support networks and family members on whom to rely for comfort 
and help. They will lack the group membership for their social identity; they 
will have a lack of knowledge of how ‘things work’ or from whom reliable, 
accurate help and guidance may be sourced. This will likely engender a fear 
and specific vulnerability which can be exploited by unscrupulous employers – 
confiscating passports, informing migrant workers of (incorrect) possible state 
punishment for any infraction of employment rules, and making their 
continued residence in the UK conditional on approval by the employer 
establishes an environment prime for abuse. 
 
It is worth remembering that the EA 2010 requires that public authorities have 
the duty to foster good relations and have regard to both tackle prejudice and 
to promote understanding (s 149(5)). This applies irrespective of the 
nationality of persons or their immigration status. 
 
Way Forward? 
 
Dismissing the migrant workers’ appeals that they were discriminated on the 
basis of their race, the Supreme Court held their mistreatment had nothing to 
do with nationality. It was due to the women’s vulnerability arising from their 
immigration status (and their visas which made them dependent on their 
employers for continued residence in the UK) and this was not a protected 
characteristic in the EA 2010. Nor was immigration status to be interpreted as 
‘race’ for the purposes of the Act. It was acknowledged that the law cannot 
redress all the forms of harm that people suffer, but Lady Hale did question 
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whether the remedy provided in s 8 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015 was too 
restrictive in scope and whether employment tribunals should be granted 
powers to offer a remedy for workers mistreated in the manner suffered by the 
appellants. Parliament could have included immigration status as a specific 
protected characteristic, but chose not to.  
 
Finally, it should be remembered that in the EA 2010, with regards to the 
public sector equality duty, in advancing equality of opportunity, due regard 
must be had to the removal or minimising of disadvantages suffered by 
particular equality groups; to meet the needs of these groups; and to 
encourage their participation in public life and the other activities of these 
groups where they are proportionately low. Private employment will be 
unlikely to achieve these aims under its current structure – perhaps legislative 
action may be the ultimate consequence of these cases. 
 
 
